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Philosophy and Theology

The ethics of fetal surgery raises numerous questions. In this reflection, I would
like to consider only three of them. Is the fetal human being a “patient” and, if so,
under what conditions? Why does the “reduction” of a twin pregnancy to one baby
cause such difficulty for defenders of abortion? Is it morally permissible to prevent
a dying fetal twin from bringing about the death or serious injury of a healthy fetal
twin by means of umbilical cord occlusion?
Arguably the most prominent scholars exploring the ethical questions about
fetal surgery are Frank A. Chervenak and Laurence B. McCullough. In a series of
books and articles, they have established themselves as the foremost authorities in
the area. How do they answer the first and fundamental question about fetal dignity?
Chervenak and McCullough point out that there has been a long-standing debate
about whether or not the human fetus has independent moral status (“Ethics of Fetal
Surgery,” Clinics in Perinatology, June 2009). As in many other debates, there has
never been a definitive answer to the question that settles the matter once and for
all to the satisfaction of all parties. Those in a given theological tradition disagree
with those in others and often disagree among themselves as well. In a similar way,
philosophy offers many different methodologies which lead to different conclusions
about the issue, so reasonable people still disagree about whether the fetal human
being should be accorded basic human rights.1 So Chervenak and McCullough hold
that the only rational course of action is to abandon the debate about whether or not
the human fetus is a patient with independent moral status, and to pursue a question
that they think is answerable, namely, whether the fetal human being has dependent moral status. In “Ethics of Fetal Surgery” they write, “A philosophically more
sound and clinically more useful line of ethical reasoning is that the moral status
of the fetus depends on whether it is reliably expected later to achieve the relatively
Laurence B. McCullough and Frank A. Chervenak, Ethics in Obstetrics and Gyne‑
cology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994): 97–101.
1
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unambiguous moral status of becoming a child and, still later, the more unambiguous moral status of becoming a person. This is called the dependent moral status
of the fetus.” On McCullough and Chervenak’s view, the human being in utero has
dignity when viable and when the pregnant woman presents herself to the doctor in
order to secure help for the human fetus.
This proposal to shelve the debate about the independent worth and focus on
dependent status fails for a number of reasons. First, the view of McCullough and
Chervenak is self-defeating. They themselves presuppose a particular methodology,
a methodology that is not universally accepted. So if we ought to abandon projects
that do not make use of a universally accepted methodology, they too should abandon their project.
Second, the McCullough–Chervenak position rests on feigned neutrality. It is
possible to be agnostic in theory about the value of human life in utero, but it is not
possible to be agnostic in practice when one is treating fetal human beings. A physician treating a pregnant woman must either act as if the human being in utero is a
second patient with independent worth or not. It is grossly irresponsible to “shelve”
the question of the moral status of the fetal human being because a physician treating a pregnant patient who has asked for medical action affecting the unborn must
act in one way or the other. If the physician harms the fetal human being, he or she
gives a practical answer (whatever the theoretical stance) that the human fetus has
no independent value.
McCullough and Chervenak assert that the fetal human being has dependent
status when and only when he or she is viable and the pregnant woman presents
herself to the physician and asks for treatment for her unborn child. McCullough
and Chervenak present no argument for the importance of viability for moral worth.
The thesis is simply asserted, the definition of viability is explained a bit, and the
conclusion is reasserted.
However, viability is irrelevant to moral status. In cases of conjoined twins, one
twin may be physiologically dependent on another, and yet no one questions whether
conjoined twins have equal basic dignity to other persons. Furthermore, viability
varies according to access to technology, but it is absurd to say that the moral worth
(even the dependent moral worth) of a person varies according to the person’s location—that is, whether the person is near a hospital or far away.2 The ability to live
in one location rather than another is irrelevant to moral status.
McCullough and Chervenak do give an argument for why the decision of the
woman is relevant to whether or not the fetus is a patient, namely, that independent
moral status arises later and will not be possible without the decision of the woman
to continue the pregnancy: “This is because the only link between a previable fetus
and its later achieving moral status as a child, and then a person, is the pregnant
woman’s autonomy, exercised in the decision not to terminate her pregnancy, because
technologic factors do not exist that can sustain the previable fetus ex utero. When the

For more on this topic, see section 4.1.2 of my book The Ethics of Abortion: Women’s
Rights, Human Life, and the Question of Justice (New York: Routledge, 2011).
2
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pregnant woman decides not to terminate her pregnancy and when the previable fetus
and pregnant woman are presented to the physician, the previable fetus is a patient.”
This argument is unsound. It is false that the only link between a previable fetus
and its later achievement of moral status is the choice of the woman. If by “link”
they mean a necessary (but not sufficient) condition, they are correct that a necessary
condition for a child’s reaching the age of two is that the mother does not abort him
or her, but they are incorrect in claiming that this is the only condition. Other links,
understood in this sense, include that the child does not die of natural causes prior
to two years of age, that the child is not killed shortly after birth, and that a forced
abortion is not performed, among many others. If we understand the “link” of a
woman’s choice not to have an abortion as a sufficient condition, similar problems
arise. Since Chervenak and McCollough’s argument rests on a false premise, it does
not justify their conclusion.
Chervenak and McCollough’s treatment of fetal surgery is flawed in other
ways as well. They write,
To protect the woman from being coerced, her husband or partner and other
family members should be reminded that although they may have strong
views for or against her participation, their role should be to support and
respect the woman’s decision-making process and its outcome. Their relationship to her is primarily one of obligation to respect and support her
decision. Family members do not have the right to make decisions for her.
When necessary, this aspect of the informed consent process should be made
clear to family members. Clinical investigators should ensure that everyone involved in the consent process takes a strictly nondirective approach.
Although not currently required in federal consent regulations, prospective
monitoring of the consent process (eg, in random sampling) could be used to
enforce the nondirective approach.

Chervenak and McCollough offer no justification for any of these controversial claims.
It is true in current U.S. law that the woman has the legal right to make the decision
to abort. Whether or not she also has the moral right to fetal homicide (as performed
in a pregnancy “reduction”) remains a topic of vigorous disagreement. Legally, there
is no obligation whatsoever for family members or anyone else for that matter to
refrain from voicing their opinions about her contemplated choice as much as they
like. At least in the United States, the first amendment of the Constitution protects
free-speech rights, which are not rescinded in family relationships or when one takes
the Hippocratic Oath. In ethical terms, there is simply no obligation “to support and
respect” someone else’s decision, whatever that decision may be. If a decision is an
ethically permissible or commendable one, then it should be respected and supported.
If a decision is an ethically impermissible one, it should be neither respected nor supported. The person who makes the decision should be respected and supported, as
is appropriate for all persons with dignity, but not the decision itself. Clear-headed
people have no obligation to support and respect ethically wrong decisions, such as
the decision to drive under the influence. Love and respect for others, including the
potential drunk driver, demands that we seek ways to help them avoid wrongful
choices, including in many circumstances trying to talk them out of it.
On a positive note, Chervenak and McCollough are correct in noting how fetal
homicide impedes scientific research: “From the perspective of investigators, to obtain
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the cleanest results about outcomes for fetuses and future children, one would not
want any pregnancies in which fetal surgery occurred to result in elective abortions.”
In his article “Fetal Therapy: Practical Ethical Considerations,” Yves Ville makes the
same observation: “Owing to the high incidence of TOP [termination of pregnancy]
following prenatal diagnosis of these conditions, comparative studies are going to
be difficult to perform” (Prenatal Diagnosis, July 2011).
In this discussion, TOP is a favored term, but this is unfortunate, because
“termination of pregnancy” (TOP) is ambiguous and euphemistic. It is ambiguous
because vaginal birth, cesarean section, and spontaneous miscarriage also “terminate”
a pregnancy and because abortion can take place in cases where no “termination of
pregnancy” occurs, as in the fetal homicide of one twin when the other twin is left
alive. The acronym TOP is euphemistic because, even more than the phrase “termination of pregnancy,” it sounds benign, innocent, and noncontroversial. The reality is
better conveyed by the more accurate, honest, and precise term “abortion.”
Ville raises other ethical questions about fetal surgery. He notes a certain bias
among practitioners for giving treatments, which may not be in the patient’s best
interest: “Offering treatment for a fetus demonstrating objective signs for an irreversibly poor outcome is questionable in that the benefit of treatment can be expected to
be little if any and medical enthusiasm may also be strengthened with the view to
improve one’s own practice with the procedure.” A surgeon’s desire to strengthen
surgical skills or pioneer new techniques may come into conflict with providing
what is best for both patients.
Ville also claims that “prenatal diagnosis is the only field of medicine in which
termination has a role in the management of a disease.” This is false, because “termination” of a patient is not management of a disease. As Jorge Garcia points out in his
judicious discussion of physician-assisted suicide, killing is not the relieving of pain.
Garcia’s reflections can be extended to also show that killing is not managing a disease:
Ending [a patient’s] pain cannot be a benefit to her for the usual reason, then,
because [in physician-assisted suicide] the patient does not experience relief
and thereafter live pain-free. As the end of her pain here does not improve her
experience, neither does it improve her life, her condition. Rather, she (her
integrated human life) ends along with the pain, and she is in no condition
at all during the period when she is lifeless. We cannot, then, meaningfully
compare it with her condition over the same time had she lived. . . . Thus, it is
difficult to see just what benefit our killing renders her, as it improves neither
her experience, nor her life, nor her condition.3

Just as killing people to relieve their pain is not pain relief, so too abortion is not
management or cure of disease. Indeed, if we define disease as a lack of proper biological functioning to a greater or lesser degree, fetal killing induces the maximum
of disease, complete nonfunctioning.
About fetal moral status Ville writes, “Although the concept of the fetal s tatus
gaining more independence from its mother with gestational age is universally
accepted, its importance is to be balanced with other issues, including maternal safety
J. L. A. Garcia, “The Doubling Undone? Double Effect in Recent Medical Ethics,”
Philosophical Papers 36.2 (2007): 245–270, original emphasis.
3
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as well as the severity of the fetal condition.” However, it is not universally accepted
that fetal status is linked to gestational age such that the more physiologically developed the fetus becomes, the greater the value the fetal human being has. This gradualist
or developmental view of the value of human life prior to birth is controversial and is
rejected by many people on a variety of grounds. Obviously, those who oppose fetal
homicide because all human life has equal basic value reject the view that fetal worth
develops in the course of pregnancy.4 But many of the most prominent supporters
of abortion, such as Peter Singer, Michael Tooley, David Boonin, and Judith Jarvis
Thomson, also reject this view. Ville offers no argument for this view, but simply
assumes without justification that the developmental view is obviously true.
Indeed, Ville’s view of fetal status is inconsistent. He writes,
The issue of fetal analgesia touches on the surgical approach itself inasmuch
as on the “primum non nocere” principle in all procedures invasive to the
fetus itself. It is well established that very preterm neonates experience pain,
and related autonomic neural connections function from around 22 weeks of
gestation. It is therefore important that any directly invasive fetal procedure
be preceded by appropriate fetal analgesia. . . . Practitioners who undertake
termination of pregnancy at 24 weeks or later should also consider the requirements for fetal analgesia or sedation prior to feticide before inducing labor.

This approach surely does not work. If a fetal human being should not be harmed
(primum non nocere), it is true that this principle requires the use of analgesia for
operations in which the human being in utero may suffer, but a fortiori it is also
true that the more significant harm of death should not be inflicted. The primum non
nocere principle either applies to the unborn or it does not.
This disjunction is also apparent in twin pregnancies. The “reduction” of a pregnancy from twins to a single baby is controversial even among those who otherwise
staunchly defend fetal homicide. Responding to a New York Times Magazine story
by Ruth Padawer that raised the issue in public awareness, William Saletan’s article
in Slate, “Flaws in Pro-Choice Logic,” puts the spotlight squarely on the problem for
defenders of abortion.5 Why should defenders be troubled by abortion that reduces
twins to a single baby? They clearly are, but they have a difficult time articulating why.
Saletan recognizes the schizophrenic thinking of many defenders of fetal homicide:
Embryos fertilized for procreation are embryos; embryos cloned for research
are “activated eggs.” A fetus you want is a baby; a fetus you don’t want is a
pregnancy. Under federal law, anyone who injures or kills a “child in utero”
during a violent crime gets the same punishment as if he had injured or killed
“the unborn child’s mother,” but no such penalty applies to “an abortion for
which the consent of the pregnant woman . . . has been obtained.” Reduction
destroys this distinction. It combines, in a single pregnancy, a wanted and an
For a philosophical justification for the equal basic worth of all human beings, see my
Ethics of Abortion; on the developmental view and why it is mistaken, see section 4.3. See too
my article “Equal Rights, Unequal Wrongs,” First Things 204 (August–September 2011): 21–23.
5
Ruth Padawer, “The Two-Minus-One Pregnancy,” New York Times Magazine, August 10,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/14/magazine/the-two-minus-one-pregnancy.html.
William Saletan, “Flaws in Pro-Choice Logic,” National Post, August 17, 2011, http://fullcomment
.nationalpost.com/2011/08/17/william-saletan-the-flaws-in-pro-choice-logic/.
4
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unwanted fetus. In the case of identical twins, even their genomes are indistinguishable. You can’t pretend that one is precious and the other is just tissue.

Killing one twin in utero while letting the other live brings into full consciousness the
doublethink that is usually merely implicit, revealing no minor cognitive dissonance.
One final question about fetal surgery is the ethics of umbilical cord occlusion
in cases of twin–twin transference syndrome.6 In such cases, the twins are connected
by a shared placenta. One of the twins is dying (from imminent, irreversible cardiac
failure, for example), but the other twin is healthy. When the first twin dies, the other
twin has a high risk of death or permanent, serious neurological injury.
Is it morally permissible to perform umbilical cord occlusion to prevent the
dying twin from bringing about the death or serious injury of the healthy twin?  
Umbilical cord occlusion cuts off the circulatory link between the twins, preventing
the dying twin from harming the healthy twin, but at the same time it cuts off the
life-supporting link of the dying twin to the placenta. The one action brings about
two effects, one good and the other bad. In terms of double-effect reasoning, the
question in part is the following: Is umbilical cord occlusion selective feticide or is
it the foreseen but not intended death of one twin to save the other twin?
Supposing for the sake of argument that the death of the weaker twin is not
desired as a means or an end in itself, and that the fourth condition of double-effect
reasoning is met, namely, that there is a just cause for allowing the evil effect. My
view is that the justification or condemnation of umbilical cord occlusion depends on
how one understands the distinction between intended effects and merely foreseen
effects. If all the certain or simultaneous effects of the action are intended, then
according to double-effect reasoning, it is impermissible to bring about the negative
effect—specifically, fetal demise following umbilical cord occlusion. Although others
would disagree with me, it is my opinion, however, that if the intended effects are
understood to be limited to what is chosen as a means or an end, as part of the plan,
or as desired effects,7 then umbilical cord occlusion would be permissible according
to double-effect reasoning, despite its certain and simultaneous negative effect of
accelerating the death of the dying twin. It is permissible to not prevent the foreseen
death of one person in order to save the life of another.
Fetal surgery doubtless gives rise to other ethical issues as well, but twin–twin
transfusion syndrome is among the most difficult. Without a cogent answer to the
questions of fetal dignity and reduction of pregnancy, the likelihood of coming to a
just solution in cases of twin–twin transfusion syndrome is remote.
Christopher K aczor

For the medical background, see, for example, Ramen H. Chmait and Ruben A. Quintero, “Operative Fetoscopy in Complicated Monochorionic Twins: Current Status and Future
Direction,” Current Opinion in Obstetrics and Gynecology 20.2 (April 2008): 169–174; and
A. Cristina Rossi and Vincenzo D’Addario, “Umbilical Cord Occlusion for Selective Feticide in Complicated Monochorionic Twins: A Systematic Review of Literature,” American
Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology 200.2 (February 2009): 123–129.
7
See, for example, John Finnis, Germain Grisez, and Joseph Boyle, “‘Direct’ and
‘Indirect’: A Reply to Critics of Our Action Theory,” The Thomist 65.1 (January 2001): 1–44.
6
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Journals in Philosophy
and Theology

Bioethics
Volume 25, Number 4
May 2011
The Virtue Ethics Approach
to Bioethics
S. Holland
This paper discusses the viability of a virtuebased approach to bioethics. Virtue ethics
is clearly appropriate to addressing issues
of professional character and conduct. But
another major remit of bioethics is to evaluate the ethics of biomedical p rocedures in
order to recommend regulatory policy. How
appropriate is the virtue ethics approach
to fulfilling this remit? The first part of
this paper characterizes the methodology
problem in bioethics in terms of diversity,
and shows that virtue ethics does not simply
restate this problem in its own terms. However, fatal objections to the way the virtue
ethics approach is typically taken in bioethics
literature are presented in the second section
of the paper. In the third part, a virtue-based
approach to bioethics that avoids the shortcomings of the typical one is introduced and
shown to be prima facie plausible. The upshot
is an inviting new direction for research into
bioethics’ methodology.
Volume 25, Number 5
June 2011
The Dead Donor Rule, Voluntary Active
Euthanasia, and Capital Punishment
C. Coons and N. Levin
We argue that the dead donor rule, which
states that multiple vital organs should only
be taken from dead patients, is justified
neither in principle nor in practice. We use

a thought experiment and a guiding assumption in the literature about the justification of
moral principles to undermine the theoretical justification for the rule. We then offer
two real world analogues to this thought
experiment, voluntary active euthanasia
and capital punishment, and argue that the
moral permissibility of terminating any
patient through the removal of vital organs
cannot turn on whether or not the practice
violates the dead donor rule. Next, we consider practical justifications for the dead
donor rule. Specifically, we consider whether
there are compelling reasons to promulgate
the rule even though its corresponding
moral principle is not theoretically justified.
We argue that there are no such reasons.
In fact, we a rgue that promulgating the
rule may actually decrease public trust in
organ procurement procedures and medical
institutions generally—even in states that do
not permit capital punishment or voluntary
active euthanasia. Finally, we examine our
case against the dead donor rule in the light
of common arguments for it. We find that
these arguments are often misplaced—they
do not support the dead donor rule. Instead,
they support the quite different rule that
patients should not be killed for their vital
organs.

Clinics in
Perinatology
Volume 36, Number 2
June 2009
Ethics of Fetal Surgery
F. A. Chervenak and L. B. McCullough
This article provides a comprehensive
approach to the ethics of clinical investigation of fetal surgery. Investigators should
address the initiation and assessment of clinical trials to determine whether they establish
a standard of care and use an appropriate informed consent process to recruit and enroll
subjects, consider whether selection criteria
should include the abortion preferences of
the pregnant woman, and consider whether
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physicians have an obligation to offer referral to such investigation. This approach is
comprehensive because it takes account of
the physician’s obligations to the fetal patient, the pregnant woman, and future fetal
and pregnant patients. The comprehensive
approach to the ethics of fetal surgery is
applied to the example of in utero surgical
management of spina bifida.

Journal of Law,
Medicine and Ethics
Volume 35, Number 5
May 2009
Is There A Duty to Share
Genetic Information?
S. M. Liao
A number of prominent bioethicists, such as
Parker, Lucassen and Knoppers, have called
for the adoption of a system in which by
default genetic information is shared among
family members. This paper suggests that
a main reason given in support of this call
to share genetic information among family
members is the idea that genetic information is essentially familial in nature. On
examining this “familial nature of genetics”
argument, the paper shows that most genetic
information is only shared in a weaker way
among family members and does not necessarily lead to the actual manifestation of
particular diseases. The upshot is that the
idea that genetic information is familial in
nature does not provide sufficient ground
for moving towards a system in which by
default genetic information is shared among
family members.
Volume 37, Number 1
Spring 2009
The Vulnerability of the Very Sick
J. Menikoff
When seriously ill patients for whom existing treatments are inadequate are invited to
participate in clinical trials that offer a new
treatment, should those persons be consid-
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ered “vulnerable”? And if so, what additional
protections should they be accorded? This
article attempts to provide some answers.

Journal of
Medical Ethics
Volume 37, Number 2
February 2011
Ethical Challenges in Fetal Surgery
A. Smajdor
Fetal surgery has been practised for some
decades now. However, it remains a highly
complex area, both medically and ethically. This paper shows how the routine
use of u ltrasound has been a catalyst for
fetal surgery, in creating new needs and
new incentives for intervention. Some of
the needs met by fetal surgery are those
of parents and clinicians who experience
stress while waiting for the birth of a fetus
with known anomalies. The paper suggests
that the role of technology and visualisation
techniques in creating and meeting such
new needs is ethically problematic. It then
addresses the idea that fetal surgery should
be restricted to interventions that are life-
saving for the fetus, arguing that this restriction is unduly paternalistic. Fetal surgery
poses challenges for an autonomy-based
system of ethics. However, it is risky to circumvent these challenges by restricting the
choices open to pregnant women, even when
these choices appear excessively altruistic.
Volume 36, Number 10
October 2010
Decapitation and the
Definition of Death
F. G. Miller and R. D. Truog
Although established in the law and current
practice, the determination of death according to neurological criteria continues to be
controversial. Some scholars have advocated
return to the traditional circulatory and respiratory criteria for determining death because
individuals diagnosed as ‘brain dead’ display
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an extensive range of integrated biological functioning with the aid of mechanical
ventilation. Others have attempted to refute
this stance by appealing to the analogy
between decapitation and brain death.
Since a decapitated animal is obviously
dead, and ‘brain death’ represents physiological decapitation, brain dead individuals
must be dead. In this article we r efute
this ‘decapitation gambit.’ We argue that
decapitated animals are not necessarily dead,
and that, moreover, the analogy between
decapitation and the clinical syndrome of
brain death is flawed.

Journal of Medicine
and Philosophy
Volume 33, Number 2
April 2008
Four Queries concerning
the Metaphysics of
Early Human Embryogenesis
A. A. Howsepian
In this essay, I attempt to provide answers
to the following four queries concerning
the metaphysics of early human embryogenesis. Following its first cellular fission,
is it coherent to claim that one and only
one of two “blastomeric” twins of a human
zygote is identical with that zygote? Following the fusion of two human pre-embryos,
is it coherent to claim that one and only one
pre-fusion pre-embryo is identical with that
postfusion pre-embryo? Does a live human
being come into existence only when its
brain comes into existence? At implantation,
does a pre-embryo become a mere part of
its mother? I argue that either if things have
quidditative properties or if criterialism is
false, then queries and can be answered in
the affirmative; that in light of recent developments in theories of human death and in
light of a more “functional” theory of brains,
query can be answered in the negative; and
that plausible mereological principles require
a negative answer to query.

Volume 34, Number 1
February 2009
Brain Damage and the
Moral Significance of Consciousness
G. Kahane and J. Savulescu
Neuroimaging studies of brain-damaged
patients diagnosed as in the vegetative state
suggest that the patients might be conscious.
This might seem to raise no new ethical questions given that in related disputes both sides
agree that evidence for consciousness gives
strong reason to preserve life. We question
this assumption. We clarify the widely held
but obscure principle that consciousness is
morally significant. It is hard to apply this
principle to difficult cases given that philosophers of mind distinguish between a range of
notions of consciousness and that is unclear
which of these is assumed by the principle.
We suggest that the morally relevant notion
is that of phenomenal consciousness and then
use our analysis to interpret cases of brain
damage. We argue that enjoyment of consciousness might actually give stronger moral
reasons not to preserve a patient’s life and,
indeed, that these might be stronger when
patients retain significant cognitive function.
Volume 36, Number 3
July 2011
Confronting Moral Pluralism in
Posttraditional Western Societies:
Bioethics Critically Reassessed
H. T. Engelhardt
In the face of the moral pluralism that results
from the death of God and the abandonment of a God’s eye perspective in secular
philosophy, bioethics arose in a context that
renders it essentially incapable of giving
answers to substantive moral questions, such
as concerning the permissibility of abortion,
human embryonic stem cell research, euthanasia, etc. Indeed, it is only when bioethics
understands its own limitations and those
of secular moral philosophy in general can
it better appreciate those tasks that it can
actually usefully perform in both the clinical
and academic setting. It is the task of this
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paper to understand and reevaluate bioethics
by understanding these limits. Academic
bioethicists can analyze ideas, concepts, and
claims necessary to understanding the moral
questions raised in health care, assessing
the arguments related to these issues, and
provide an understanding of the different
moral perspectives on bioethical issues. In
the clinical setting, bioethicists can provide
legal advice, serve as experts on IRBs, mediating disputes, facilitating decision-making
and risk management, and clarifying normative issues. However, understanding this
is only possible when one understands the
history, genesis, and foundations of bioethics and its inability to provide a resolution to
postmodern moral pluralism.

Kennedy Institute
of Ethics Journal
Volume 18, Number 2
June 2008
A Proposed Ethical Framework
for Vaccine Mandates:
Competing Values and
the Case of HPV
R. I. Field and A. L. Caplan
Debates over vaccine mandates raise intense
emotions, as reflected in the current controversy over whether to mandate the vaccine
against human papilloma virus (HPV), the
virus that can cause cervical cancer. Public
health ethics so far has failed to facilitate
meaningful dialogue between the opposing
sides. When stripped of its emotional charge,
the debate can be framed as a contest between
competing ethical values. This framework
can be conceptualized graphically as a
conflict between autonomy on the one hand,
which militates against government intrusion, and beneficence, utilitarianism, justice,
and nonmaleficence on the other, which may
lend support to intervention. When applied
to the HPV vaccine, this framework would
support a mandate based on utilitarianism,
if certain conditions are met and if herd
immunity is a realistic objective.
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Neuroethics
Volume 2, Number 1
November 2009
Will Neuroscientific Discoveries about
Free Will and Selfhood Change Our
Ethical Practices?
C. Kaposy
Over the past few years, a number of authors
in the new field of neuroethics have claimed
that there is an ethical challenge presented
by the likelihood that the findings of neuroscience will undermine many common
assumptions about human agency and selfhood. These authors claim that neuroscience
shows that human agents have no free will,
and that our sense of being a “self” is an
illusory construction of our brains. Furthermore, some commentators predict that our
ethical practices of assigning moral blame, or
of recognizing others as persons rather than
as objects, will change as a result of neuroscientific discoveries that debunk free will and
the concept of the self. I contest suggestions
that neuroscience’s conclusions about the
illusory nature of free will and the self will
cause significant change in our practices. I
argue that we have self-interested reasons
to resist allowing neuroscience to determine
core beliefs about ourselves.

Philosophical Studies
Volume 146, Number 2
November 2009
The Loop Case and Kamm’s
Doctrine of Triple Effect
S. M. Liao
Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Loop Case is
particularly significant in normative ethics
because it calls into question the validity of the intuitively plausible Doctrine of
Double Effect, according to which there is a
significant difference between harm that is
intended and harm that is merely foreseen
and not intended. Recently, Frances Kamm
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has argued that what she calls the Doctrine of
Triple Effect (DTE), which draws a distinction between acting because-of and acting
in-order-to, can account for our judgment
about the Loop Case. In this paper, I first
argue that even if the distinction drawn by
DTE can be sustained, it does not seem to
apply to the Loop Case. Moreover, I question
whether this distinction has any normative
significance. The upshot is that I am skeptical that DTE can explain our judgment about
the Loop Case.

duty of competence moving the boundaries
between experimental surgery, therapeutic
innovation and standard care. In addition,
the technical success of a fetal intervention
can only rarely fully predict the postnatal
outcome. Managing uncertainty regarding
long-term morbidity and the possibility for
fetal therapy to change the risk of perinatal
death into that of severe handicap remains a
critical factor affecting women’s choice for
TOP as an alternative to fetal therapy.

Utilitas

Prenatal Diagnosis
Volume 31, Number 7
July 2011

Volume 23, Number 2
May 2011

Fetal Therapy:
Practical Ethical Considerations

Twinning and Fusion as Arguments
against the Moral Standing of
the Early Human Embryo

Y. Ville

M. Ramsay

Progress in prenatal diagnosis can lead to
the diagnosis of severe fetal abnormalities for which natural history anticipates a
fatal outcome or the development of severe
disability despite optimal postnatal care.
Intrauterine therapy can be offered in these
selected cases. Prenatal diagnosis is the only
field of medicine in which termination is an
option in the management of severe diseases.
Fetal therapy has therefore developed as
an alternative to fatalist expectant prenatal
management as well as to termination of
pregnancy (TOP). There are few standards
of fetal care that have gone beyond the stage
of equipoise and even fewer have been
e stablished based on appropriate studies
comparing pre- and postnatal care. Several
ethical questions are being raised as fetal surgery develops, including basic Hippocratic
principles of patients’ autonomy and doctors’

Some philosophers argue that, because it
is subject to twinning and fusion, the early
human embryo cannot hold strong moral
standing. Supposedly, the fact that an early
human embryo can twin or fuse with another
embryo entails that it is not a distinct individual, thus precluding it from holding any
level of moral standing. I argue that appeals
to twinning and fusion fail to show that the
early human embryo is not a distinct individual and that these appeals do not provide us
with plausible reasons for denying the strong
moral standing of the early human embryo.
I recognize one possible exception to this
general assessment, a particular version of the
appeal to fusion. Embryo fusion that results
in tetragametic chimerism provides some
reason for doubting the early human embryo’s
moral standing. But twinning and fusion are
otherwise irrelevant in this context.
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